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Abstract Currently, regulatory authorities and consumers ask for more cost trans-
parency with respect to financial product components. In life insurance, for instance,
the premium for products should be split in its components: A premium for death ben-
efits, the savings premium, the cost of an investment guarantee, and the administration
costs. In this regard, it is important for insurance companies and regulators to know to
what extent the way of presenting the prices of an offer affects consumer evaluation
of the product. Based on a paper by Huber et al. (How do price presentation ef-
fects influence consumer choice? The case of life insurance products. Working paper,
2011) as presented at the annual meeting of Deutscher Verein für Versicherungswis-
senschaft in 2011, this article presents the effects of different forms of presenting the
price of life insurance contract components and especially of investment guarantees
on consumer evaluation of this product. This is done by means of an experimental
study using a representative panel for Switzerland and by focusing on unit-linked life
insurance products. The findings reveal that, contrary to consumer products, there is
no effect of price bundling and price optic on consumer evaluation and purchase in-
tention for life insurance products. However, there is a significant moderating effect
of consumer experience with insurance products on this relationship.
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Zusammenfassung Derzeit fordern Versicherungsaufsichtsbehörden und Konsu-
mentenschützer verstärkt eine Kostenaufschlüsselung von Finanzprodukten bezüg-
lich ihrer Produktkomponenten und deren Preise. Für Lebensversicherungsprodukte
lässt sich beispielsweise die Gesamtprämie in eine Todesfallprämie, die Sparprämie,
die Kosten für die gewährten Finanzgarantien und die Betriebskosten aufschlüsseln.
Für Versicherungsunternehmen wie auch für die Aufsicht ist es wichtig zu wissen,
inwieweit die Preisdarstellung eines Versicherungsprodukts die Bewertung des Kon-
sumenten beeinflusst. Basierend auf dem Arbeitspapier von Huber et al. (How do
price presentation effects influence consumer choice? The case of life insurance pro-
ducts. Working paper, 2011), das im Rahmen der Jahrestagung 2011 des Deutschen
Vereins für Versicherungswissenschaft vorgestellt wurde, zeigt der vorliegende Bei-
trag anhand eines Experiments – unter Zuhilfenahme einer repräsentativen Stichpro-
be für die Schweiz – den Effekt verschiedener Formen von Preisdarstellungen von
Versicherungsvertragskomponenten einer fondsgebundenen Lebensversicherung mit
Investmentgarantie auf die Konsumentenbewertung des jeweiligen Produktangebots.
Als Hauptergebnis der Analysen lässt sich festhalten, dass Preisbündelung oder Prei-
soptik bei fondsgebundenen Lebensversicherungsprodukten im Gegensatz zu Kon-
sumgütern keinen Effekt auf die Produktbewertung des Konsumenten hat. Allerdings
zeigt sich ein signifikanter Moderationseffekt bei Konsumentenerfahrung mit Versi-
cherungsprodukten.
1 Introduction
In the competition between insurance companies with respect to gaining and keeping
new customers, an attractive product design becomes increasingly important. Due
to demographic change and a declining confidence in state-run pension schemes,
this holds true in particular for the case of life insurance products. In this case,
the product design could be enhanced by using marketing mix strategies. For in-
stance, insurers can add certain product features to the base contract such as invest-
ment guarantees, or use different price presentation strategies. Especially as a con-
sequence of the financial crisis of 2007–2009, investment guarantees in the savings
part of a life insurance product or in unit-linked life insurance products in partic-
ular may be of substantial value for customers, as they ensure that at least a min-
imum amount is remunerated, even if the value of the mutual fund falls below a
predefined guarantee level. Furthermore, as e.g. the case of the car industry shows,
different price presentation formats might have a substantial impact on consumers’
product evaluation and purchase intention. In this respect, current regulatory efforts
in most countries of the European Union intend to require insurance companies to
provide a more detailed price presentation, including administration costs, to their
consumers.
Hence, in this paper, we summarize the main results of the study by Huber et
al. (2011) by analyzing consumers’ product evaluation regarding different forms of
price presentation, namely price bundling and price optic. By using an experimen-
tal between-subject design with a representative sample for Switzerland, the pa-
per examines whether different forms of price presentations—i.e. a single up-front
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payment for the guarantee, monthly payments, or the guarantee price defined as
an annual percentage of the value of the mutual fund,—or different forms of price
bundling—i.e. showing the total price of the product versus viewing the prices of
all individual product components (i.e., term life insurance costs, investment guar-
antee costs, and administration costs)—will influence consumers’ product evalua-
tion.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains the
theoretical background, the model framework, and the hypotheses based on the
relevant literature. Section 3 presents the experimental study design, Sect. 4 dis-
cusses the main results, and Sect. 5 summarizes the findings and provides impli-
cations.
2 Theoretical background, model framework, and hypotheses
2.1 Framing and mental accounting
When making decisions and particularly regarding risky or probabilistic choices, in-
dividuals use different mental models, which often contradict the basic principles of
expected utility theory (see, e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1974). The literature stream
based on the theoretical breakthrough of Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979) examined this phenomenon in detail and detected
many biases and heuristics (for an overview, see, for instance Camerer and Loewen-
stein 2003). In the case of presenting price information, especially framing, i.e., the
reliance on how information is presented (Tversky and Kahneman 1981, 1986; Kah-
neman and Tversky 1984), and mental accounting, i.e., the dividing of current and
future assets into separate, non-transferable portions (Thaler 1999), play an important
role in the evaluation of product offers. Framing the same problem differently leads
to different perceptions of the decision problem and evaluation of probabilities and
outcomes (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). This irrational behavior also proves true in
the financial decision making process with risky or probabilistic choices (Johnson et
al. 1993; Wakker et al. 1997). Thus, presenting price information of the components
of an insurance contract differently may lead to a different evaluation of the product,
even though all products have identical present values.
Furthermore, mental accounting plays an important role in consumer evaluation
of price information. Mental accounting builds upon the properties of prospect the-
ory and its value function, introduced by Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991, 1992). According to
this value function, it predicts that gains (losses) have a higher (lower) value if sepa-
rately presented, instead of in a combination (Thaler 1985, 1999). Thus, in the case of
gains, consumers prefer to separate two positive events, thus obtaining several small
gains rather than the whole sum. In the case of losses, consumers prefer one single
loss rather than several small losses of the same amount. Particularly the latter has to
be considered in the model framework, since premiums are assumed to be paid for
insurance contracts (and especially for investment guarantees) are perceived more as
losses than as gains or savings. This implies that consumers’ evaluation of the product
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offers should be more positive for products with a bundled price presentation than for
products with a debundled price information, i.e., showing the prices of the several
contract components.
The literature stream on price presentations shows that consumers are gen-
erally sensitive to price presentation effects and the framing of price informa-
tion (partitioned vs. consolidated prices), see, for example, Bauer et al. 2006;
Chakravarti et al. 2002; Drumwright 1992; Johnson et al. 1999; Puto 1987; Ya-
dav and Monroe 1993. Thus, price presentation plays an important role in pric-
ing policies regarding the subjective perception of consumers (Diller 2000; Diller
and Herrmann 2003). Bundling, i.e., packaging two or more services or products,
often for a special price (Guiltinan 1987), is used in many industries as a suc-
cessful marketing strategy. Academic literature investigated mainly how products
and services can be optimally combined (Hanson and Martin 1990; Bell 1986;
Guiltinan 1987). Furthermore, psychological aspects have been examined, particu-
larly regarding the evaluation process of bundled products, such as, for example,
anchoring and adjusting models (see for example, Gaeth et al. 1991; Yadav 1994).
The theoretical basis for the psychological research stream builds upon the above ex-
plained prospect theory and mental accounting and uses reference price concepts. Ad-
ditionally, academic literature emphasizes the consumers’ evaluation of bundled of-
fers and the importance of price presentation and framing effects (Johnson et al. 1999;
Mazumdar and Jun 1993; Yadav and Monroe 1993; Yadav 1994).
However, the research stream on price bundling often focuses on the effect of em-
bedded price discounts and the perceived savings (for an overview, see, for example,
Krishna et al. 2002). Chakravarti et al. (2002) and Morwitz et al. (1998) investigate
the effects on consumers’ evaluation of partitioned prices, i.e., of separate prices for
each component (vs. consolidated prices, i.e., a single, equivalent price) and show
that there is a lower price perception and a higher repurchase intention if price in-
formation is partitioned. Contradictory to these studies are the results of Beshears
et al. (2010). Investigating retirement saving products, they find that an increase of
cost transparency, which corresponds to partitioned price information, does not affect
portfolio choice. Thus, the above findings may differ in the case of long-term saving
products, such as, for example, life insurance products. However, aside from this
study, little research has been conducted to investigate the role of price presentation
and price bundling in long-term saving products, and particularly in unit-linked life
insurance products and their effect on consumer evaluation. An overview of heuristics
and biases for these products is presented by Benartzi and Thaler (2007).
Thus, in Huber et al. (2011), the aim is to investigate whether or not consumers’
evaluations vary if the price information of a life insurance contract is differently pre-
sented and the sum of the bundled components and the total price are exactly equiv-
alent. Hence, it is analyzed whether there is a price presentation format (regarding
price framing, price bundling) that consumers prefer in the case of long-term saving
products. In this context, the following hypotheses are assumed:1
H1a: Positive consumer evaluations of an investment product augment, as price in-
formation is bundled. This comprises (i) the perceived satisfaction with the
1Here, only three out of eight hypotheses are presented; for the full study, we refer to Huber et al. (2011).
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product and (ii) the perceived likelihood of recommending the product to other
people.
H1b: Positive consumer evaluations of an investment product augment, as price in-
formation is abstract. This comprises (i) the perceived satisfaction with the
product and (ii) the perceived likelihood of recommending the product to other
people.
The alternative hypotheses predict that the bundling or abstracting of price informa-
tion have no effect on consumer evaluations.
H2: Consumer experience with insurance or investment products moderates the ef-
fects of bundling on consumer satisfaction. Specifically experienced consumers
are more satisfied if prices are presented as a bundle and less satisfied if the
prices are presented unbundled, whereas less experienced consumers do not
show different reactions to different price bundling presentations.
The alternative hypotheses predict that experience has no moderating effect.
3 Experimental study
3.1 Experimental design, sample and measures
To test these hypotheses, an experimental design is used, out of whom two studies are
presented in this short version (see Fig. 1). The overall experimental design consisted
of an online survey (originally in German and French) in which the evaluation of the
product cards has been embedded (see Huber et al. 2011). The sample of n = 647
is representative for Switzerland regarding gender (male = 50.5%; female = 49.5%)
and region (here only focusing the German (70.5%) and the French (28.6%) speaking
part of Switzerland). Due to the calibration features, focus was laid on 25 to 35 year
olds regarding the age of the participants. Thus, there is a subsample of around n = 55
for each product card (see Table 1).
The survey was divided into two sections. In the first section, a product card has
been shown to the participants for evaluation. Every subsample only received one
product card for evaluation. The consumer evaluation included three dependent vari-
ables (see Johnson et al. 1999):
• the perceived satisfaction with the offer, measured on a 5 point scale from 1 (not
satisfied) to 5 (satisfied),
• the likelihood of recommending the offer, measured on a 5 point scale from 1
(disagree) to 5 (agree),
• and the purchase intention, measured on a binary scale from 0 (no) to 1 (yes).2
In the second section of the survey, the moderating variable “consumers’ experi-
ence with financial and insurance products” has been measured, including multiple
measures regarding:
2For the analyses regarding purchase intention, please refer to Huber et al. (2011).
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Fig. 1 Model framework (short version, see Huber et al. 2011)
Table 1 Calibrated premiums per product offer (payments per month if not stated differently; see Huber
et al. 2011)
Price bundling factor Price optic factor
No guarantee Guarantee level: 12,000
Single up-front
guarantee costs
Monthly
guarantee
costs
Guarantee costs in %
of the annual fund
value
Bundling (P ) Offer 1 Offer 4 Offer 7 Offer 10
100 100 + 644 in
the first month
105 105 + 1% p.a.
Partial bundling Offer 2 Offer 5 Offer 8 Offer 11
Base contract (P ) 100 100 100 105
Inv. guarantee costs (PG,a) 0 544 up-front 5 1% p.a
No bundling Offer 3 Offer 6 Offer 9 Offer 12
Risk premium (PD) 1 1 1 1
Savings premium (Ps) 91 91 91 96
Administrative costs (kP ) 8 8 8 8
Inv. guarantee costs (PG,a) 0 544 up-front 5 1% p.a
• expertise in general using the items of Mishra et al. (1993),
• expertise on a personal level using the items of Mitchell and Dacin (1996),
• expertise regarding the product prices using the items of Kopalle and Lindsey-
Mullikin (2003).
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These items have been adjusted to the insurance and financial product context
and the scales have been unified to a five-point scale ranging from 1 (disagree) to 5
(agree).
3.2 Manipulation of the independent variables: modeling the unit-linked life
insurance contracts and calibration features
Regarding the manipulations of the independent variables, two factors are used: The
bundling factor, which consists of a single bundled price for the unit-linked life in-
surance product and the investment guarantee, a partially bundled price with separate
prices for the base contract and the guarantee, and a debundled price presentation
with separate prices for the guarantee, the risk premium, the savings premium, and
the administration costs. The optic factor consists of a product without any guarantee
(and thus, no guarantee costs; this product serves as contrast product), a product with
an investment guarantee presented as single up-front guarantee cost, a product with
monthly guarantee costs, and a product with guarantee costs as a % of the annual
fund value. Thus, a 3 (bundling: bundled price vs. partially bundled price vs. debun-
dled price) ×4 (price optic: no guarantee vs. guarantee with single up-front costs vs.
guarantee with monthly cost vs. guarantee with costs in percent of the annual fund
value) between-subject design is found, consisting of twelve different variations of
price information (see Table 1).
To determine different price optic and bundling of investment guarantees in unit-
linked life insurance policies, first, a unit-linked base contract without guarantee is
modeled that contains a savings part invested in a mutual fund and a fixed death
benefit D that is paid out if the policyholder dies during the term of the contract. In
case of survival until maturity T , the policyholder receives the value of the mutual
fund, which yields a stochastic payoff at maturity in case of the the base contract.
For administration costs, a percentage k of the gross premium P is charged. The
risk premium for the death benefit payment is denoted by PD and subtracted from
the gross premium. The remainder constitutes the savings part and is invested in the
mutual fund. To ensure a minimum survival payoff, the base contract is then extended
to further offer a constant guaranteed minimum payoff GT for an additional guarantee
price PG. The total premium paid into the contract including the additional costs for
an investment guarantee can thus overall be split up into four components (Table 1).
A detailed and formal derivation of the prices can be found in Huber et al. (2011).
In calculating the contract features, an actuarial pricing approach is used for the
base contract to determine the risk premium for the death benefit and the table of the
German Actuarial Association DAV 2008 T for the mortality rates. Furthermore, for
the underlying mutual fund, we refer to the model framework as described in Gatzert
and Schmeiser (2009). The investment guarantee in the savings part is determined by
using a risk-neutral valuation, assuming that the fair price is the reservation price for
an insurance company. Due to different price presentation formats of the guarantee
costs, an absolute amount is considered, using the gross premium (respectively the
sum of the gross premiums) and an annual percentage fee, which in the present setting
corresponds to a guaranteed interest rate of 1.68% on the savings part. Both fees are
modeled such that the present values are identical. To summarize, it is ensured that
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the guarantee costs are the same and only the price presentation differs (absolute costs
as single and annual premium and annual percentage fee of the fund value) in order
to isolate the effect of the price presentation on consumer choice.
For the empirical survey, the model is calibrated as follows: Contract duration
T = 10 years, age of the male insured x = 30 years, the gross premium P = 100,
administrative costs k = 8%, and the guarantee GT = 12,000 (sum of gross pre-
miums). The input parameters of the underlying mutual are based on Gatzert et al.
(2011) (medium-risk fund), with σ = 8.61%, a continuous riskless rate of return of
r = 2.15%, and the corresponding discrete riskless rate of rD = exp(r)− 1 = 2.17%.
To enhance the understandability of the product, monthly premiums are provided in
the questionnaire and approximated by P monthly = P annual/12. The resulting prices
regarding different types of price optic and price bundling for the different product
offers are laid out in Table 1.
4 Results
Study 1: Basic model using MANOVA In the first study, multivariate analyses of
variance (MANOVA) models are used to test the hypotheses regarding consumer
evaluation, based on consumer satisfaction and likelihood of recommending. Hy-
pothesis 1a predicts that consumer evaluation of the product augments as price in-
formation is bundled. MANOVA analyses show that there was no significant effect
of the price bundling dimension on consumer evaluation, as F(df = 4, error df =
1270) = 0.363, p = .835, using Pillai’s trace criterion. This implies that there are
no significant differences between bundled, partially bundled, and debundled price
conditions regarding the satisfaction with the product and the likelihood of recom-
mending. Thus, Hypothesis 1a has to be rejected.
Hypothesis 1b predicts that positive consumer evaluations of an investment prod-
uct augment as price information is abstract. Pillai’s trace does not show any signif-
icant differences between no guarantee cost, the initial up-front premium, monthly
guarantee costs or guarantee costs as a percentage, regarding the satisfaction with the
product and the likelihood of recommending, F(df = 6, error df = 1270) = 0.859,
p = .525. Therefore, Hypothesis 1b must be rejected as well. Furthermore, there is no
interaction between price bundling and price optic, F(df = 12, error df = 1270) =
0.727, p = .726, using Pillai’s trace. Further, the between-subject effects also do not
show a significant effect.
Study 2: Moderated model To understand the key drivers of different forms of price
presentations on consumer evaluation, the model is reduced to its most basic com-
ponents. Thus, for the independent variables, the “bundling” factor is reduced to the
two extreme categories, namely 1 = unbundled price presentation and 2 = bundled
price presentation.3 Consumer satisfaction with the product serves as the dependent
3Similarly, the optic factor is reduced into two extreme categories, i.e. 1 = without guarantee and 2 = with
guarantee. Similar results could be found for the 2 (bundling: unbundled vs. bundled) ×2 (guarantee:
without guarantee vs. with guarantee) between-subject factorial design (see Huber et al. 2011).
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variable. Furthermore, the model is extended by using experience as a moderator to
gain further insight into the relationship between price presentation and consumer
satisfaction. To derive this factor, a principal component analysis with orthogonal ro-
tation on the collected items is conducted with respect to the participants’ experience
with insurance and financial products, resulting in a satisfactory reliability level of
α = .89. This factor is recoded on a five-point scale from 1 = ‘less experienced’ to
5 = ‘very experienced’ (for the full analysis, see Huber et al. 2011). Hypothesis 2 pre-
dicts that consumer experience with insurance or investment products will moderate
the effects of bundling on consumer satisfaction. Specifically, experienced consumers
will be more satisfied if prices are presented as a bundle and less satisfied if prices
are presented unbundled, whereas less experienced consumers will not show different
reactions to different price bundling presentations.
The results from this analysis reveal a statistically significant interaction be-
tween the bundling factor and the moderator experience (FInteraction(df = 4) = 2.58,
p = .04), thus confirming a moderating effect of experience on the relationship be-
tween bundling and consumer satisfaction. In addition, a simple effect analysis allows
an assessment of the interaction term. Looking at the significant values for each sim-
ple effect, there is a significant difference between experienced and less experienced
consumers for the unbundled price presentation (F (df = 4) = 2.23,p = 07) and no
significant difference for the bundled price presentation (F (df = 4) = 1.6,p = .17).
Similarly, a difference in consumer satisfaction between bundled and unbundled price
presentation can be observed at levels 1, 3 and 5 of experience. Thus, the mean sat-
isfaction for very experienced consumers is considerably lower for unbundled price
presentation than for bundled price presentation, confirming Hypothesis 2. The re-
sults of the moderated model indicate that consumer experience with insurance or
investment products contributes significantly to the relationship of price bundling
and consumer satisfaction. Particularly, very experienced consumers are less satisfied
with the product if prices are presented unbundled or additional investment guaran-
tees are embedded. Further analysis are provided in Huber et al. (2011).
5 Implications and summary
Based at Huber et al. (2011), this paper examines whether consumer evaluation (sat-
isfaction and recommendation) and purchase intention for investment guarantees em-
bedded in unit-linked life insurance products depend on different forms of price pre-
sentation (bundling and optic) of the guarantee costs by means of an experimental
study for a representative Swiss panel. The prices for the guarantees are calculated
using risk-neutral valuation and the fair price is interpreted as a reservation price for
an insurance company offering these kinds of guarantees to their consumers. In a next
step, an analysis whether different forms of price presentations (i.e., single up-front
payment for the guarantee; monthly payment; guarantee price as a percentage of the
value of the mutual funds) influence consumers’ decision and evaluation of the con-
tract is obtained. In addition, different forms of product bundling with respect to the
price presentation are considered. Here, products with identical present values are
offered to the participants of the experimental study showing the overall price of the
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product versus viewing the pricing of the different product components (term life in-
surance with risk premium and savings premium, investment guarantee in the savings
part, administration costs).
In regard to price presentation, it turned out from the empirical analysis that nei-
ther price bundling nor price optic had a statistically significant effect on consumer
evaluation, or on consumer purchase intention of the product. No statistically signifi-
cant differences between the bundled, partially bundled and debundled pricing forms
can be confirmed in this analysis. In addition, combinations of different forms of
price optic (guarantee prices in different absolute and relative terms) had no substan-
tial impact on the decisions of the participants. Hence, these findings differ in relation
to the outcomes of similar empirical studies in the area of consumer goods (see, for
example, Johnson et al. 1999).
However, consumers’ experience with insurance or investment products turned out
to be highly statistically significant predictors for explaining the relationship between
the product offer with its price presentation and consumer evaluation of the product.
Here, very experienced participants were less satisfied with a product if prices were
presented unbundled or if additional investment guarantees were embedded, whereas
the differences in product offer evaluations of less experienced participants were not
significant.
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